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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

ISSUES ON PRINCE, YEATES' APPEAL
1.

Did the evidence and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom,

viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict in favor of Mr. Young fail
to provide any rational basis for the verdict? Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89,1 101, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, cert, granted, 122 S. Ct.
2326 (2002); Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998).
2.

Has Prince, Yeates failed to meet its duty to marshal the evidence by

focusing only on Mr. Young's claim for breach of contract arising from the 19981999 agreement to provide Mr. Young fair and equitable compensation with
respect to the helicopter cases, ignoring Mr. Young's claim for breach of contract
based upon his original contract of employment under which Prince, Yeates was
to compensate Mr. Young based upon his performance, failing to mention Mr.
Young's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in each of these contracts, and omitting reference to other relevant
evidence, including evidence bearing on the amount of Mr. Young's
compensation? Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 975-976

1

(Utah 2002); Neelv v. Bennett. 2002 Ut. App. 189. U 11, 51 P.3d 724.
3.

Has Prince, Yeates failed to discharge its duty to marshal the evidence

supporting the jury's verdict in favor of Mr. Young and to present the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict in providing only selected snippets of
evidence dealing only with the 1998-1999 direct communications between Mr.
Young and Prince, Yeates with regard to fair and equitable compensation with
respect to the helicopter cases without addressing the additional testimony and
documentary evidence with regard to those discussions and the context of those
discussions and ignoring other highly relevant and significant evidence?
Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles. 48 P.2d 968, 976-976 (Utah 2002);
Neely v. Bennett. 2002 Ut. App. 189, U 11, 51 P.3d 724.
4.

Did the trial court err in granting Mr. Young's motion for summary

judgment on Prince, Yeates' claim for forfeiture of Mr. Young's compensation
based upon Mr. Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and in denying Prince,
Yeates' motion for partial summary judgment on the forfeiture claim on grounds
that, among other things, Mr. Young, as a mere employee of the Firm, owed no
fiduciary duty under the controlling Utah case law? Review of a trial court's
ruling on a motion for summary judgment is for correctness. Surety Underwriters
v. E & C Trucking. Inc.. 2000 UT 71. f 14, 10 P.3d 338.
5.

Did Prince. Yeates fail to preserve and waive its challenge to the trial

2

court's ruling precluding the admission at trial of evidence concerning Mr.
Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by inviting the ruling excluding such
evidence, by failing to argue in the trial court that the evidence of Mr. Young's
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty was relevant to the issues at trial, as it now
urges for the first time on appeal, and by failing to seek the admission at trial of
evidence concerning Mr. Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty or to proffer
any such evidence? Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 972
(Utah 2002); Badger v. Brooklyn Candy Company, 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah
1998).
B.

ISSUES ON MR. YOUNG'S CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in precluding Mr. Young from submitting his

claim for attorney fees to the jury and in denying Mr. Young's post-trial motion
for an award of attorney fees and expenses? "Whether attorney fees are
recoverable in an action is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.''
Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996).
Mr. Young preserved this issue in the trial court by seeking to submit his claim for
attorney fees to the jury [R. at 2025. pgs. 194-195 and pgs. 244-254] and by his
post-trial motion for an award of attorney fees and expenses. [R. at 1807].
2.

Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Young prejudgment interest?

Review of a trial court's ruling denying prejudgment interest is for correctness.

3

Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995); Andreason v. Aetna
Casualty and Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993). Mr. Young
preserved this issue in the trial court by seeking prejudgment interest in his
proposed form of Judgment to which Prince, Yeates objected [R. at 1767].
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Prince, Yeates' appeal and Mr. Young's cross-appeal follow a jury verdict
and Judgment that Prince, Yeates was in breach of contractual obligations to
provide Mr. Young fair and equitable compensation, apart from his salary, by
reason of a contingent fee in the sum of $641,548.38 received as a result of the
settlement of personal injury claims by Mr. Young's client, Charles Krause,
arising as a result of a helicopter crash near Grace, Idaho.1
Following trial, the Court instructed the jury that Mr. Young's claims for
breach of contract against Prince, Yeates had three aspects:
1.

A claim that Prince, Yeates was obligated under its original oral

contract of employment with Mr. Young to compensate Mr. Young based upon

'Mr. Young represented Mr. Krause in Mr. Krause's litigation for personal
injuries and also represented Mr. Krause's employer, Mountain West Helicopter,
in litigation by Mountain West for damages to its helicopter. The Krause'
personal injury case was referred to in the trial court and is referred to in this brief
as "the Krause fee". Mountain West's litigation for damages to its helicopter was
referred to in the trial court and will be referred to in this brief as "the Mountain
West case." The two cases together were referred to and are referred to in this
brief as "the helicopter cases."
4

his performance. [R. at 1759; Addendum B (Special Verdict Form)].
2.

A claim that Prince, Yeates was obligated under an additional oral

contract or a modification of Mr. Young's original contract of employment to
provide Mr. Young fair and reasonable compensation with respect to any
contingent fee obtained in the helicopter cases. [Id.]:
3.

A claim that Prince, Yeates breached its implied contractual

obligation of good faith and fair dealing inherent both in Mr. Young's original
employment agreement and Prince, Yeates' subsequent agreement for the payment
of fair and equitable compensation with respect to any fee received in the
helicopter cases. [R. at 1714-1716 (Jury Instructions on Good Faith & Fair
Dealing); R. at 1704-1717 (Jury Instructions on Contract Issues); Addendum A
(Jury Instructions)].2
The case was submitted to the jury on a Special Verdict which, together
with the trial court's instructions with regard to the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, reflected that the jury could return a verdict for Mr. Young if it
found for Mr. Young on any of the three aspects of Mr. Young's breach of
contract claims. The questions propounded to the jury, without exception by

2

In the jury instructions conference between the court and counsel for both
parties, Prince, Yeates' counsel, Mr. Eckersley, conceded "that breach of contract
is also a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing," [R. at 2025, Pg.
242] and "if you expressly breach a contract, you would have obviously breached
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." [R. at 2025, pg. 242].
5

Prince, Yeates. asked, and the jury's verdict thereon was:
1. Do you find that Mr. Young was entitled to additional
compensation as a result of the Krause fee either under his original
oral employment contract or a valid contract with regard to the
helicopter cases?
ANSWER:

Yes.

2. What is the fair and reasonable amount of the fee which
should be paid to Mr. Young?
ANSWER:

$280,000.

[R. at 1758-1759; Addendum B (Special Verdict) (emphasis added)]. Following
return of the Special Verdict, the trial court entered Judgment on the Special
Verdict. [R. at 1985; Addendum C (Judgment)].
Prince, Yeates appeals from the denial of its motion for a directed verdict
and from the denial of Prince, Yeates' two pretrial motions for summary judgment
on Mr. Young's claims for breach of contract. Prince, Yeates also appeals from
the Court's order granting Mr. Young's motion for summary judgment on Prince,
Yeates' motion for forfeiture of Mr. Young's compensation based upon alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty by Mr. Young and denying Prince, Yeates' motion for
partial summary judgment on the same forfeiture claims and from the Court's
order precluding the admission of evidence at trial concerning Mr. Young's
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.
Mr. Young cross-appeals from the trial court's rulings at trial precluding

6

him from submitting his claim for attorney fees to the jury and denying his post
trial motion for attorney fees. Mr. Young also cross-appeals the trial court's order
denying him prejudgment interest.
A.

FACTS RELATING TO PRINCE, YEATES' APPEAL
1.

Mr. Young's Original Employment Agreement

Mr. Young entered into his original contract of employment with Prince,
Yeates in 1995. [Prince, Yeates' Opening Brief (hereinafter "Brief) at 2]. The
terms of Mr. Young's original contract of employment were negotiated
exclusively between Mr. Young and John Ashton, who at the time was the
President of Prince, Yeates and functioned as the head of its Litigation group.
[Brief at 12]. The original contract of employment was an oral contract. [Brief at
2]. None of the terms of the original contract of employment were ever reduced to
writing. [Brief at 2; R. at 2026, p. 295]. The testimony of the witnesses was,
moreover, in agreement as to the terms of Mr. Young's original contract. In
particular, the testimony was unequivocal that while Mr. Young's initial salary
was $70,000, his compensation, like that of every lawyer at Prince, Yeates, would
ultimately be based upon his performance.
Mr. Young testified in negotiating his original contract of employment, Mr.
Ashton told Mr. Young his compensation would be based upon performance:
Q. And was that salary or compensation to be subject to
adjustment?
7

A.

Yes.

Q

Upon what, if anything?

A. Well the salary that has been discussed, in my mind, was
never a guaranteed salary. I understood that I was employed at will
that I could quit at any time, that they could terminate me at any
time. And that salary was subject to adjustment up or down,
depending on my performance. In other words, if I didn't justify
my salary by the revenue that I brought in, it would be reduced or I
would be terminated.
If I more than justified my salary, it would be increased or I
would leave the firm and take my work with me where I felt like I
could make more money.
[R. at 2026 pp. 293-94 (emphasis supplied)].
On cross examination, Mr. Ashton admitted he told Mr. Young that Mr.
Young's compensation would be increased if warranted by his performance:
Q

You remember that he was going to be an associate, true?

A

Yes.

Q

And there was discussion about his salary.

A

Yes.

Q

And the amount of his salary.

A

Yes.

Q

And there was discussion about performance.

A

Yes.

Q And you indicated to Mr. Young that the firm would
measure his performance, correct.
8

A

Yes.

Q And you indicated to Mr. Young that his
compensation would be affected by his performance.
A

After the first year, yes.

Q In other words, if Mr. Young proved himself, if he did
well, if he attained good results, he could expect to make more
money.
A

I think that's generally accurate.

[R. at 2025 p. 173 (emphasis added)].
John Chindlund, Prince, Yeates' President and its representative at trial,
testified Mr. Young's employment, like that of other Prince*, Yeates' lawyers, was
subject to adjustment based on performance:
Q Lawyer compensation at Prince Yeates during the
period that Mr. Young worked there was based on
performance, wasn't it?
A Let me answer that this way. In a very general sense,
ultimately, I guess you'd say, compensation for all of us at the
firm has to do with performance.

Q But in general, if a lawyer at the firm could expect
that, as his performance improved in terms of dollars, that his
compensation would go up.
A That would be a general - that would generally be
accurate.
[R. at 2025. pgs. 83-85 (emphasis added)].

9

Mr. Ashton told Mr. Young he would be considered for partnership in two
to three years, based upon his performance. [R. at 2025, pg. 174].
Significantly, though Prince, Yeates arguments that Mr. Young had no
contractual right to additional compensation with respect to the Krause fee
proceed upon the assertion and assumption that Mr. Young's compensation was
limited to his salary, the record is utterly devoid of any evidence that it was ever
part of Mr. Young's employment agreement that Mr. Young's compensation was
limited to his salary. The evidence is to the contrary: Mr. Young was to be
compensated based upon his performance. Indeed, there was never even any
requirement that Mr. Young assign his clients or work to the Firm - the cases that
Mr. Young brought in were his cases.3

3

At trial, Mr. Young testified:
I believed that I had an interest in the [Krause] case from the outset of
my employment, based on the terms of my employment and the fact it was
my case that I brought to the firm and I was doing all the work on it.
[R. at 2026, pgs. 375-376]. Mr. Young also testified:
Q In connection with your hiring at Prince Yeates. was there
any agreement on your part to give up or assign to Prince Yeates the
work that you might bring in to the firm?
A There was never any discussion about whether I was
expected to give up my work to the firm in exchange for the salary.
And that has been, perhaps, the single most aggravating thing to me
about this dispute. My work was valuable to me, thank you, and
Prince Yeates has suggested in this dispute that, in return for a
$70,000 salary, I agreed to give up all of my work to them. That
was never discussed. I was never asked to do that, and I would
never have agreed to do that. It was more important to me to have
my work than it was to have the salary that Prince Yeates had
10

Prince, Yeates* opening brief makes only passing reference to Mr. Young's
claim for breach of contract based upon his original contract of employment,
mischaracterizing the claim not as a cause of action alleged by Mr. Young and
submitted for determination by the jury, but as merely something that Mr.
Young's "counsel argued to the jury. . . ." [Brief at 12]. Additionally, Prince,
Yeates* opening brief wholly fails to marshal the evidence with regard to Mr.
Young's claim for breach of his original contract of employment, omits reference
to significant facts supporting Mr. Young's claim for breach of his original
contract of employment, and fails to present the evidence in the light most
favorable to Mr. Young. Among other failures and omissions, Prince, Yeates'
opening brief fails and omits to state or reflect that:
1.

At the time he was hired by Prince, Yeates, Mr. Young had been

engaged in the practice of law for almost 12 years, most of that time as General
Counsel for Rocky Mountain Helicopter, where he had acquired extensive
experience in helicopter litigation. [R. at 2026, pgs. 284-286].

offered me.
[R. at 2026, pg. 296]. Mr. Ashton's testimony at trial confirmed this:
Q You didn't have any discussions with Mr. Young before
he joined the firm in terms of who, as between the firm and Mr.
Young, would own the cases that Mr. Young brought to the firm,
did you?
A I don't think I had any specific discussions about that. no.
[R. at 2025. pg. 174].
11

2.

Though Prince, Yeates employed Mr. Young as an associate, Mr.

Young, as a lateral hire with substantial prior experience in the practice of law.
functioned in a position different from that of other associates. [R. at 2026. pgs.
294-295J.4
3.

Mr. Young was solely responsible for obtaining the helicopter cases.

[R. at 2025, pg. 72; 2026, pg. 306]. Apart from attorneys at the Texas firm which
was also involved in the representation, Mr. Young performed all of the work on
the helicopter cases - no Prince, Yeates attorney, other than Mr. Young,
performed any work on the cases. [Exs. 33-34].
4.

Mr. Young undertook the representation of Mr. Krause and Mountain

West expecting to be compensated for a successful result in the cases over and
above his salary. Mr. Young understood the Firm based compensation upon
performance. Additionally, he expected to become a shareholder three years after
his hiring in 1995, before the cases were concluded.
5.

Records supplied by Prince, Yeates in discovery, attested to by Mr.

Chindlund at trial, established that during Mr. Young's time at Prince, Yeates, he
collected $1,086,296 in fees (including the Krause fee). [R. at 2025, pg. 76-78].

4

It is undisputed that at the time of the initial discussions regarding Mr.
Young's potential employment at Prince, Yeates, Mr. Young informed Prince.
Yeates it made no difference to him whether wchis position in a firm is as an
associate or in an of counsel capacity.'' [Ex. 4].
12

6.

With one exception, the $1,086,296 in fees attributable to Mr. Young

is the largest amount collected by any lawyer as a result of that lawyer's work in
the period that Mr. Young worked for the Firm. The only lawyer who collected
more was John Heaton, a senior shareholder. Mr. Heaton's salary was more than
double that paid to Mr. Young. [R. at 2025. pgs. 77-78].
7.

Even excluding Krause. Prince, Yeates* records reveal Mr. Young

collected fees of $444,748 - substantially more than the $307,190 he received in
salary and benefits. [R. at 2025, pg. 77].
8.

Mr. Young, in fact, received substantially less in salary and benefits

during the period of his employment with the Firm than any shareholder of the
Firm. [Ex. 22. pg. 2].
9.

If the Court accepts Prince, Yeates" arguments, the Firm will receive

the entire Krause fee of $641,548.38. to which it contributed little, if anything,
and Mr. Young, whose collections were second highest in the Finn, will be paid
less than any shareholder of the Finn and than virtually any other lawyer.
10. The Krause fee, moreover, is extraordinary. It is the largest
contingent fee in the history of the Firm.5 [R. at 2025, pg. 75].

5

Prince. Yeates' opening brief asserts that Carl Barton, a former Prince,
Yeates attorney and Mr. Young's neighbor who introduced Mr. Young to the
Firm, "testified he told Mr. Young that [Mr. Young's] compensation would be
limited to his salary and would not include any amount for contingent fee
recoveries/'1 [Brief at 2-3]. Prince. Yeates" brief fails, however, to provide any
13

2.

The Later Agreement With Regard To Any Fee Received In
Connection With The Helicopter Cases.

Mr. Young's negotiations with Prince, Yeates, with regard to any fee
received in the helicopter cases, occurred in 1998 and the first half of 1999.
By October 1998, Mr. Young, having been passed over for partner in 1997
and denied salary increases, wanted assurance that he would receive recognition
and a substantial portion of the fee in the helicopter cases if he remained with the
Firm and was successful in securing a recovery. By October 1998, the Firm, for
its part, considered Mr. Young's future with the Firm to be uncertain. In a
memorandum dated August 18, 1998, Mr. Barton and the Firm's Associates'
Committee concluded:
No one thought Rob was ready to become a shareholder at
this time. The focus of almost all of the evaluations was an
economic one: are we making money on Rob? If so, let's not
send him away and have another empty office.

record citation for such testimony. Mr. Young denied having any such
conversation with Mr. Barton. [R. at 2026, p. 292]. Additionally, it is undisputed
that Mr. Barton was not involved in the negotiations of Mr. Young's original
contract of employment with Prince, Yeates - Mr. Young's original contract of
employment was negotiated between Mr. Young and Mr. Ashton. [Brief at 12].
Prince, Yeates' assertion that Mr. Ashton testified there was no discussion
in the negotiations leading to Mr. Young's employment with the Firm that Mr.
Young's "compensation would be made up of anything other than his salary" is
misleading. [ Brief at 14]. Mr. Ashton testified that Mr. Young's compensation
was subject to adjustment based upon performance. [R. at 2025, p. 173]. Mr.
Young secured the contingency fee representation of Mr. Krause and of Mountain
West in the helicopter cases in 1996 [Brief at 3] after he had entered into his
original contract of employment with the Firm.
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[Ex. 11 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)].
Following a meeting of the Firm's Board of Directors on August 195 1998.
the Board formally took over, from the Associates' Committee, the evaluation of
Mr. Young's status with the Firm. [Ex. 11 at pg. 2]. Some of the members of the
Firm's Board of Directors thought Mr. Young's collections were too low and that
Mr. Young should be immediately asked to leave the Firm.
On August 19, 1998, the Board asked Mr. Barton and Roger McConkie to
meet with Mr. Young "to determine why his accounts receivable and work in
process are so high." [Ex. 12 at pg. 2].6
On September 24, 1998, the Board asked Mr. Barton and Mr. McConkie to
meet with Mr. Young regarding the helicopter cases. On that same day, Mr.
Barton and Mr. McConkie met with Mr. Young. Mr. Young explained his
collections were down and his work in progress numbers were high because he
was working the helicopter cases. Mr. Young also asked how he would be
compensated out of any fee received if he was successful in the cases. [Ex. 12 at
pg. 2; Ex. 13atpg. 1].
The Board's attitude concerning Mr. Young changed dramatically upon the

6

Remarkably, some members of the Board of Directors mistakenly thought
the helicopter cases were hourly fee rather than contingent fee cases or that the
cases had been changed from hourly fee to contingent fee cases, contributing to
the perception that Mr. Young's collections were low. [Ex. 12 at pg. 2].
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receipt of Mr. Eckersley *s evaluation that the helicopter cases were potentially
very lucrative cases. The Board now recognized the helicopter cases presented the
prospect for the receipt of contingent fees far exceeding any fee the Firm had
previously obtained and which would only be realized if Mr. Young were induced
to stay. [Ex.16, pgs. 1-2; Ex. 17, pgs. 2-3].
Stipulated facts read to the jury during the trial attest that Mr. Eckersley
had a conversation with Mr. Young at this time which suggested to Mr. Eckersley
that Mr. Young was discouraged and might leave the Firm, taking the helicopter
cases with him. [R. at 2026, pg. 283]. Mr. Eckersley believes he related his
conversation with Mr. Young to Mr. Ashton. [Id-]Knowing Mr. Young wanted assurance he would be fairly compensated out
of any recovery if he were to stay, the Board charged Mr. Ashton and the Firm's
then President, Mr. Chindlund to meet with Mr. Young and to arrive at an
agreement. [Ex. 17, pg. 3]. Board minutes for November 17, 1998 state the
Associates Committee recommended Mr. Young be paid a portion of any
recovery.
The Committee realizes these cases will "make or break" Mr.
Young and it is the suggestion of the Associates Committee that
the Board consider whether a portion of any recovery should be
paid to Mr. Young as a bonus.
[Ex. 17 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)].
Between December of 1998 and May of 1999, Mr. Ashton and Mr.
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Chindlund engaged in a series of meetings with Mr. Young regarding the
compensation Mr. Young would receive out of any recovery in the helicopter
cases. [R. at 2025, pgs. 17-19; 2026, pgs. 310-311].
The Board minutes of February 17, 1999 reflect that at least by that date,
Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund were operating under directions from the Board
"to get the negotiating settled with Mr. Young and move on once and for all."
[Ex. 21 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)].
Mr. Young testified that through his meetings with Mr. Ashton and Mr.
Chindlund, he reached an oral agreement with Prince, Yeates that he was to be
paid a fair and equitable sum out of any recovery in the helicopter cases and that
the agreement was not conditioned upon further agreement as to the dollar
amount.
Q You mentioned fair and equitable compensation. Let
me ask you about that. Was there a discussion about that in this
meeting?
A Well, in virtually every meeting we had, Mr.
Chindlund or Mr. Ashton or me would make a comment along
the lines that we expect to be fair about this. They suggested,
"We expect to be fair with you, Mr. Young, in coming to an
understanding as to what is fair and equitable compensation."
I suggested I expected to be fair with them in contributing a
fee I was generating to the firm. And that, from my perspective, we
had an understanding from the outset that we were going to be
fair and equitable about this, that I was going to be fairly
compensated and that what remained to be resolved was what
represented fair compensation.
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[R. at 2026 pp. 312-13 (emphasis added)].
Consistent with Mr. Young's testimony and claim that Prince, Yeates had
agreed Mr. Young would be compensated based upon his performance, Mr.
Chindlund testified with regard to the agreement that Mr. Young was to receive
fair and equitable compensation with respect to any fee received in the helicopter
cases. Initially, however, Mr. Chindlund did so only after the Court sustained two
objections to the compound nature of the question asked by his counsel, Mr.
Eckersley, which had obviously been designed to elicit a different response:
Q At any time in the meetings, did you or Mr. Ashton, in
your presence, indicate to Mr. Young that the firm promised to pay
him a fair and equitable share of any proportion of the - excuse me
- of any fee recovered and that if in fact you could not determine
between yourselves what that amount was. you would allow that to
be determined by some third party?
Mr. Gaufin: Objection. The question is compound.
The Court: Reframe the question.
Q (By Mr. Eckersley) At any time in any of the meetings
that you had with Mr. Young, did you or Mr. Ashton, in your
presence, promise Mr. Young that he would be paid a fair and
equitable portion of any fee recovered in the helicopter cases and
that if you could not agree to a fee - that is, you, Mr. Young and Mr.
Ashton - that you'd allow a third party to determine that?
Mr. Gaufin: Sam objection. If s compound.
The Court: Sustained.
Q (By Mr. Eckersley) At any time, in the meetings that
you had with Mr. Young, did you or Mr. Ashton, in your
18

presence, promise Mr. Young that he would receive a fair and
equitable portion of the fee?
A

We told Rob that the firm wanted to treat him fairly.

[R. at 2025, pp. 60-61 (emphasis added)].
Mr. Chindlund's testimony, on cross-examination, provides even more
explicit confirmation of Mr. Young's testimony:
Q Now, if I understood you correctly, you just testified
that you had told Mr. Young, in your negotiations with him,
that the firm wanted to be fair in terms of compensating Mr.
Young with regard to [a] successful outcome in the cases.
That's true, isn't it?
A

Yes.

Q

And when you told him that, did you mean it?

A

Yes.

Q You indicated that you were [reluctant] to characterize
what you said to Mr. Young as a promise.
A

Yes.

Q But you - you told him that the firm wanted to be fair
with him and would be fair with him, and you wanted him to
believe it, didn't you?
A

Yes.

Q

And you meant it.

A

Yes.

[R. at 2025, pg. 64]. Mr. Chindlund further testified:
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Q It's true, isn't it, that when you were meeting with Mr.
Young, you and Mr. Ashton wanted to be - wanted to provide
Mr. Young with fair and equitable compensation, if there were
recoveries in the helicopter cases?
A Wanted to reward Rob, if his efforts resulted in a good
recovery for the firm. And I guess, when I say good, what I'm
talking about is a recovery over and above what the firm had
invested in the case.
Q And you wanted to do that and you told Mr. Young
that you wanted to do that, isn't that true?
A

Yes. Yes.

Q And it's correct, isn't it, that, in your meetings, you
told Mr. Young that the firm intended to fairly and equitably
compensate Mr. Young if the result that you described was
achieved. It's true, isn't it?
A

Yes.

[R. at 2025, p. 91 (emphasis added)].
John Ashton testified similarly about the meeting with Mr. Young.
Q Did you tell Mr. Young that it was your desire to
provide him with a fair amount out of the fees?
A Probably something like that. I think what we said
was we wanted to be reasonable and we wanted to try to pay
him some amount that would be reasonable, if we could reach
some sort of an agreement.
[R. at 2025, pg. 179 (emphasis added)].
Mr. Young testified Mr. Ashton told him he could expect to become a
partner in the Firm if he was successful in obtaining a recovery. [R. at 2026, pg.
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319]. Mr. Ashton's testimony at trial confirmed the subject of Mr. Young's
becoming a partner was, in fact, discussed. [R. at 2025. pg. 180].
Mr. Young testified Mr. Chindlund told Mr. Young he should be careful
not to "poison the well" by requesting too much of the Firm and if he did not
"poison the well" the Firm "would take care of hinf'when Mr. Young's work
"subsided" temporarily after completion of the cases. [R. at 2026, pgs. 318-319].
Mr. Chindlund's testimony at trial confirmed Mr. Young's testimony.7
Ultimately, Mr. Ashton, Mr. Chindlund. and Mr. Young reached a basic
understanding that any recovery would go first to reimburse the Firm for Mr.
Young's time and what Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund had asserted to be Mr.
Young's "collection deficit" with the remainder of the fee to be divided 1/3 to Mr.
Young and 2/3 to the Firm. [Ex. 24; R. at 2026, pg. 317].8
7

Mr. Chindlund testified that:
Q
And in terms of poisoning the well, those were your
terms.
A
That was my phrase.
[R. at pgs. 99-100 (emphasis supplied)].
8

In the course of their meetings, Mr. Chindlund and Mr. Ashton, for
example, convinced Mr. Young that he had a "collection deficit" of $318,000 to
the Firm which Mr. Young was required to pay back. The claimed "collection
deficit" was the reason for Mr. Young's willingness to permit deduction of the
amounts logged as fees in the two cases.
Mr. Young was not aware of it at the time, but learned through discovery
and demonstrated at trial, that he had no collection deficit to the Firm and that Mr.
Chindlund's claim of supposed collection deficit was based upon Firm
expectations, not on the actual performance of other attorneys. Mr. Young also
learned through discovery and demonstrated at trial that his collections were on
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The Board minutes of April 28. 1999 reflect that Mr. Chindlund advised
the Board that Mr. Young was "amenable*' to a 1/2 - 2/3 split. [Ex. 23 at pg. 2].9
Mr. Chindlund obtained the Board's authority and on May 5, 1999 wrote a
memorandum to Mr. Young documenting the 1/3 - 2/3 agreement. Mr.
Chindlund's memorandum stated that he sought to confirm in writing the
"understanding" existing between Mr. Young and the Firm. The memorandum
also states he was conveying "the Board's proposal that John Ashton and I
previously discussed with you, regarding the division of any recovery in
the . . . cases." [Ex. 24 (emphasis added)].
Before sending his May 5, 1999 memorandum, Mr. Chindlund also met
with the shareholders to discuss "the Firm's proposed fee splitting arrangements
with [Mr. Young]." [Ex. 70 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)].10
Mr. Young did not sign the May 5, 1999 memorandum because it omitted

par even with those of shareholders, who collected only slightly more than Mr.
Young, but were paid considerably more. In fact, documents produced by Prince,
Yeates in discovery and admitted in evidence at trial disclose that the Firm was
aware, but did not inform Mr. Young, that Mr. Young had, over the period of his
employment through March of 1999, made fully $80,000 less than the average
made by the four lowest compensated shareholders. [Ex. 22 at 2].
9

Mr. Young had requested a 50% split and agreed to the 1/3 - 2/3 split
following a "poisoning the well" discussion described below. Prince, Yeates
agreed a 1/3 - 2/3 split did not "poison the well." [R. at 2026, pgs. 323-324].
10

Mr. Barton prepared the May 3, 1999 minutes and chose the words "fee
splitting arrangements/' [Ex. 70 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)].
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reference to Mr. Ashton's statement that Mr. Young could expect to become a
partner and Mr. Chindlund's statement that the Firm would "take care of Mr.
Young" if Mr. Young "did not poison the well." Mr. Young agreed, however, to
the 1/3 - 2/3 split, at least if adjustments were made relative to the amount to be
deducted for time logged to the cases and if the Firm acknowledged the
commitments made by Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund.
Until July 7, 1999, Prince, Yeates, Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund had
never asserted that Mr. Young was not entitled to a fair and equitable portion of
any recover)7 in the helicopter cases. To the contrary, Mr. Ashton and Mr.
Chindlund had always stated that Mr. Young should receive a fair and equitable
portion of any recovery in the cases. As Mr. Chindlund testified:
Q And neither you or Mr. Ashton ever told Mr. Young the
contrary. You never told Mr. Young that the firm would not
compensate him if the successful result was achieved in the cases
during your meetings with him, did you?
A Let me answer that this way: Never told him that, but in
the context of having told him, there wasn't a legal obligation, as I
think I explained in my earlier testimony. But the answer to your
question is: Right, we didn't tell him we didn't want to treat him
fair and equitably.
Q

Never did.

A

That's correct.

[R. at 2025, p. 92].
Mr. Young's discussions with Mr. Chindlund and Mr. Ashton regarding
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the 1/3 - 2/3 division did not stand alone, but were made in the context of Mr.
Ashton's statement that Mr. Young could expect to become a partner if he were
successful in the cases and Mr. Chindlund's statement that the Firm would "take
care of him" if he did not "poison the well" and other representations by the Firm.
Mr. Young would not have agreed to the 1/3 - 2/3 split but for these commitments
and representations. [R. at 2026, pgs. 318-319, 323-324].
Prince. Yeates' opening brief focuses only on Mr. Young's claim for
breach of contract arising out of Prince, Yeates' 1998-1999 agreement to provide
Mr. Young fair and equitable compensation with respect to the helicopter cases,
ignoring Mr. Young's additional claim for breach of contract based upon his
original contract of employment for performance-based compensation.
Additionally, Prince, Yeates' opening brief wholly fails to marshal the evidence
with regard to Mr. Young's claim for breach of his contract for fair and equitable
compensation with regard to any fee received in the helicopter cases, omitting
reference to other highly relevant evidence, and fails to present the evidence in the
light most favorable to Mr. Young. Among other failures and omissions, Prince,
Yeates' opening brief fails and omits to state or reflect that:
1.

Mr. Chindlund's and Mr. Ashton's negotiations with Mr. Young were

not precatory or illusory, but occurred at the express direction of the Board, over a
period of several months, and were for the purpose of inducing Mr. Young to
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remain with the Firm in order that the Firm would be assured of participating in
any recoveries received in the cases.
2.

Mr. Chindlund's and Mr. Ashton's negotiations with Mr. Young

included specific statements that Mr. Young could expect to be made a partner if
he was successful in obtaining a recovery in the helicopter cases and statements
that Mr. Young should be careful "not to poison the well" in order "that the Firm
would take care of him." [R. at 2026, pgs. 318-319].
3.

Mr. Young was justified in believing that Mr. Chindlund's letter of

May 5, 1999 [Ex. 24] incorrectly failed to include important elements of the
parties' agreement with regard to fair and equitable compensation agreed to by
Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund.
3.

Prince, Yeates' Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith
And Fair Dealing

Prince, Yeates' opening brief fails even to refer to the facts regarding
Prince, Yeates" breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, let
alone to marshal the evidence regarding Mr. Young's claim for breach of the
implied covenant or to present that evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. Prince, Yeates' purpose in these failures and omissions, obviously,
is to falsely suggest that Mr. Young made excessive and unwarranted demands,
ultimately leading to Mr. Young's supposedly voluntary termination of his
employment with the Firm. The evidence and testimony is to the contrary.
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On June 23, 1999, Mr. Young met with the Firm's Board to go over his
June 15, 1999 memorandum and Mr. Chindlund's memorandum of May 5, 1999.
The minutes of the June 23, 1999 Board meeting reflect Cwan agreement in
principal" was reached on the 1/3 - 2/3 split, including two adjustments Mr.
Young had requested. [Ex. 28, pg. 2]. Mr. Young was informed at that meeting
that the Board would not and could not promise he would be made a shareholder
as the shareholders, not the Board, were required to vote to make an attorney a
shareholder. From Mr. Young's standpoint, at least, the issue of whether a
shareholder would so vote was left for future determination. [Ex. 36; R. at 771775].
On Thursday and Friday, June 10-11, 1999. after a substantial period of
litigation and discovery, a mediation was held in Dallas, Texas with respect to the
litigation brought on behalf of Mr. Krause, resulting in an agreement on the
principal terms of a settlement. Mr. Young did not attend the mediation and
learned of the agreement to settle on Monday, June 14, 1999. The settlement was
later finalized by the execution of settlement documents in August 1999. The
settlement proceeds were payable in August 1999 and were distributed in
September 1999. [R. at 2026, pgs. 337-338].
Mr. Young did not immediately inform the Board of the tentative
agreement to settle because he perceived the Firm was back pedaling on its prior
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commitments to him and was concerned the Firm would not proceed in good faith
to perform its agreements with him if it knew a mediation settlement had been
reached. [R. at 2026, pgs. 338-340]. The evidence at trial amply demonstrated
that Mr. Young's concerns were well founded.
The Firm's shareholders met on June 30, 1999. As in the case of the
minutes for the prior May 3, 1999 shareholders" meeting, Mr. Barton prepared the
minutes of the June 30, 1999 shareholders' meeting and those minutes, as initially
prepared, reflect that Mr. Chindlund reported to the shareholders on the "fee
splitting arrangement which Rob and the Board have been discussing and
negotiating."11 [Ex. 76, pg. 3 (emphasis added)].
In the course of Mr. Young's discussions with the Firm relative to the two
cases, the need to advance funds to the Texas firm to balance expenses was

n

The original version of the June 30, 1999 shareholder meeting minutes
read, in pertinent part, "John Chindlund also gave a status report about recent
meetings with Rob Young and the fee splitting arrangement Rob and the
Board have been discussing and negotiating." [Ex. 76 (emphasis supplied)].
Six weeks later, on the day after the Firm filed its Complaint and under the
signature of Mr. Barton, the minutes were altered to read "John Chindlund also
gave a status report about recent meetings with Rob Young and the potential
bonus arrangement Rob and the Board have been discussing/' [Ex. 75
(emphasis supplied)]. The obvious inference, supported by the evidence, is that
the Firm saw a distinction between a "fee splitting arrangement*' Prince, Yeates
was "discussing and negotiating"' with Mr. Young and a mere "potential bonus*'
that the Firm was only "discussing" with him. The alteration of the June 30, 1999
minutes, to say only a "bonus" was "discussed," presumably took care of the
concerns arising out of that distinction. The Firm provided no reasonable
explanation for the change. [Ex. 76, pg. 3; 75, pg. 2].
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repeatedly emphasized. On June 23. 1999, Richard Blanck, the newly elected
President of the Firm, even advised the Board of Directors of the Firm and Mr.
Young that in a recent discussion with Helen Shiflar, an office manager at the
Firm, he had learned that Prince. Yeates had an understanding with the Texas firm
to pay those expenses in installments. [R. at 2026. pg, 342].
Mr. Young subsequently learned there was, in fact, no arrangement with
the Texas firm to equalize expenses by payments in installments and that the
imbalance in expenses was causing the Texas firm to reconsider its agreement to
an equal distribution of the fee with regard to Mr. Krause. [Ex. 74]. Mr. Young,
therefore, personally advanced to the Texas firm payment for expenses in the sum
of $35,000. [R. at 2026. pg. 334].
The relationship between Mr. Young and the Firm rapidly deteriorated in
July 1999. Mr. Young wrote a memorandum to the Board on July 2. 1999 in
which he complained the Firm had not acted to fulfill its commitments to him,
stated the Krause case was going to settle resulting in a fee of about $650,000, and
further stating "I will leave the Firm effective July 16, 1999, if we are unable to
agree on an equitable distribution of the fee, and my status and future here.'"
[Ex. 29 (emphasis added)].
Mr. Young met with the Board on July 7, 1999. By that time, the Board,
however, had learned of the mediation settlement of the Krause case independent
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of Mr. Young's July 2, 1999 memorandum, had convened another shareholders
meeting, obtained a vote that Mr. Young would not be made a shareholder [Ex.
30], and prepared a memorandum to Mr. Young which it delivered at the end of
the meeting. [Ex.31].
The Board's July 7, 1999 memorandum claimed, for the first time, that
Mr. Young had no entitlement to any portion of the recovery in the helicopter
cases, but offered to grant Mr. Young a "bonus" of $50,000. [Ex. 31]. Mr.
Young rejected that proposal as dishonest and insulting. The Board's
memorandum accepted Mr. Young's resignation effective July 16, 1999. [Ex.
31].
Mr. Young asserts and the evidence at trial demonstrated, that after
learning of the mediation settlement and of the amount of the settlement, the Firm
seized what it saw as an opportunity to keep the fee for itself and to exclude Mr.
Young from participating in the fee which he had, among other things, been
promised. Mr. Ashton's testimony at trial was impeached by his prior deposition
testimony, which plainly reveals the truth in Mr. Young's assertion that the Firm
seized upon what it saw as an opportunity to exclude Mr. Young from the
compensation which he was due:
Q But let me call your attention to page 173 of your
deposition. And to the testimony beginning at line 16.
A

Yes.
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Q And my question to you will be: Were you asked these
questions and did you give these answers?
A

Yes.

Q "Question: Can I ask you something realistically? Did
the firm ever or anybody in it ever get offended with Mr. Young
prior to the time that they knew that there was a $600,000 fee for the
firm?
"Answer: I don't know. Well, I say that may be the case. We
clearly, in the exchange of correspondence in June, set a number of
people strongly against Mr. Young.
"Question: Did anybody get strongly against Mr. Young
before they knew how much money they were going to get with
regard to the contingency fee in the Krause case?
"Answer: I don't know. I would not be surprised at all if
that were the case/'
Were you asked those questions and did you give those
answers?
A

I did.

Q

Was it the truth?

A

Yes.

[R.at2025,pgs. 184-185].
The Firm's abrupt termination of Mr. Young's employment prevented Mr.
Young from finalizing with the Firm the dollar amount that would fairly and
equitably compensate him with regard to the recovery in the helicopter case and
resulted in Mr. Young's leaving the Firm with no final agreement on the actual
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dollar amount of the compensation to be paid with regard to the Krause fee.
Further, because Prince, Yeates had not paid its portion of the expenses to the
Texas firm, Mr. Young himself paid those expenses. [R. at 2026, pg. 334].
Instead of receiving a fair and equitable portion of the $641,548.38 fee and
remaining at Prince, Yeates as a shareholder with the Firm's commitment to "take
care of him". Mr. Young was not only unexpectedly forced out the door and
forced, without opportunity for advance preparation, into private practice, but was
also saddled with the continued representation of Mountain West in the Mountain
West case, without any support from Prince, Yeates.12
B.

FACTS RELATING TO MR. YOUNG'S CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Mr. Young's Claim For Attorney Fees And Expenses

During closing argument, Prince, Yeates' counsel, Mr. Eckersley,
acknowledged that, in the discussions and negotiations wherein Prince, Yeates
and Mr. Young unsuccessfully sought agreement on an amount that represented
Mr. Young's fair and equitable portion of the fee (in the context of the statements
made by Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund that, if Mr. Young were successful, he

12

In the Mountain West case. Judge Kimball granted summary judgment
against Mountain West, under the so-called "purely economic loss doctrine." Mr.
Young appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed in an unreported decision and Mr. Young petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. The United States Supreme Court denied
the petition. [R. at 2026, pgs. 353-354].
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could expect to become a partner and that Prince, Yeates would take care of him
after the helicopter cases ended). Mr. Young never asked for more than $204,500.
[R. at 2027, pg. 440]. Moreover, even after it became apparent, by July 15, 1999.
that Prince Yeates would not honor the commitments Mr. Young testified that the
firm made to him as part of the discussions and negotiations, Mr. Young asked for
only $250,000 as his fair and equitable portion of the Krause fee. [R. at 1932].
Ultimately, after enduring litigation first initiated by Prince, Yeates in
August 1999, including the Firm's three motions for summary judgment, a
petition for interlocutory appeal a motion for directed verdict, trial and now this
appeal, all intended to deprive Mr. Young of any portion of the fee, the jury
awarded Mr. Young $280,000 — $30,000 more than he claimed, at the outset, as
his fair and equitable compensation. The award comes, however, after years of
intransigence by Prince, Yeates , the reasonably foreseeable consequence of which
was to substantially dilute Mr. Young's victory by leaving Mr. Young to pay his
own attorneys' fees from the amount the jury awarded him as his fair and
reasonable portion of the fee. If Prince, Yeates had, in good faith, divided the fee,
in September 1999, by giving Mr. Young what he then, in good faith, claimed,
i.e., $30,000 less than the jury awarded, Mr. Young would have received
$250,000 with no attorneys' fee obligation. For these reasons, Mr. Young
asserted a claim for attorneys' fees under Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828,
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840 (Utah 1992). Mr. Young sought an award for attorneys' fees and expenses
totaling $396,245.59. [R. at 1842]. The trial court denied Mr. Young's claim for
attorney fees and expenses, reasoning that Mr. Young's attorney fees were not
recoverable under the rationale of Heslop. [R. at 1985, pg. 3; Addendum C].
2.

Mr. Young's Claim For Prejudgment Interest.

Mr. Young's claim to recover fair and reasonable compensation with
respect to the helicopter cases was presented and quantified for the jury through
the presentation of extensive facts and figures, including, but not limited to,
evidence regarding the amount of the fees generated by Mr. Young, the amount of
Mr. Young's salary in relation to that of other Firm attorneys, and the amount of
Mr. Young's compensation in relation to that of other Firm attorneys with similar
billings and collections. The trial court, nonetheless, denied Mr. Young's claim
for prejudgment interest reasoning Mr. Young's claim for additional
compensation was "unliquidated." [R. at 1985, pg. 3; Addendum C, pg. 3].
ARGUMENT
I.

THE JURY'S SPECIAL VERDICT IN FAVOR OF MR. YOUNG ON
HIS CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST PRINCE,
YEATES IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
REQUIRES THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ON THE
JURY VERDICT BE AFFIRMED
Though Prince, Yeates' Opening Brief focuses on only a single claim for

breach of contract - Mr. Young's claim for breach of Prince, Yeates' agreement to
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pay him fair and reasonable compensation with respect to any recoveries in the
helicopter cases - Mr. Young, in fact, alleged and the trial court properly
instructed the jury that Mr. Young's claims for breach of contract had three
separate, but complimentary aspects, each of which independently warranted a
finding that Prince, Yeates breached its contractual obligations to Mr. Young.
The evidence presented to the jury viewed, as it must be. in the light most
favorable to the jury's Special Verdict, amply supports the jury's verdict,
requiring that the trial court's Judgment on the verdict be affirmed. Campbell v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, H 101, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44
(citation omitted), cert, granted, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2002); Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972
P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998) ("[when examining jury verdicts such as these, 'we
review the evidence and all inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict,"' and reverse the lower court only when
'we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict'.") (citations
omitted).13

13

The fact Mr. Young's claims for breach of contract are sanctioned by the
evidence and verdict requires the conclusion that Prince, Yeates' pre-trial motion
for summary judgment on Mr. Young's claims were properly denied.
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A.

The Jury's Special Verdict And The Trial Court's Judgment
Thereon Are Amply Supported By The Evidence With Regard To
Mr. Young's Claim For Breach Of Contract Based Upon Mr.
Young's Original Contract Of Employment

The evidence presented to the jury on Mr. Young's claim for breach of
contract arising from Mr. Young's original contract of employment, viewed in the
light most favorable to the jury's Special Verdict, amply supports the jury's
verdict. The jury could well have concluded from the evidence that Mr. Young's
compensation was subject to increase based upon Mr. Young's performance and
that Mr. Young's performance in securing the Krause fee, together with his other
collections, warranted the payment of fair and reasonable additional compensation
to Mr. Young.
Mr. Young's original contract of employment was a contract for services.
It is well-established that, in the case of contracts for services, where the dollar
amount of compensation is subject to adjustment or otherwise not fixed
exclusively at a set amount, the law implies that compensation in a "reasonable"
amount is intended. Professor Corbin's treatise correctly states the rule:
An agreement to pay a "fair price" for . . . services may be
regarded as identical with a promise to pay a "reasonable price." If
such is the accepted meaning, the agreement is sufficiently definite
for enforcement. It is obvious that a contract to pay a reasonable
price, or reasonable compensation for services, leaves plenty of
opportunity for difference of opinion and dispute. It can not
properly be assumed that only one price or wage is reasonable under
the particular circumstances of any case. Reasonableness is a matter
of opinion, and opinions differ, even though they are equally honest
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and well informed. A promise to pay a reasonable priee or wages
is, in its legal effect, a promise to pay a sum that a court or jury
may determine in case of dispute . . . .
How much is reasonable in any particular case is a question
of fact, not one of law.
Corbin on Contracts § 4.5 at 595 (Vol. 1, 1993) (emphasis added); see also
Varnev v. Ditmars. 111 N.E. 822, 823-824 (N.Y. App. 1916) (cited in Prince,
Yeates' Opening Brief at pgs. 25-26).
The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the law as stated by Professor Corbin
in its decision in The Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285
(Utah App. 1994). Won-Door involved an oral contract for payment of a
"reasonable" fee by Won-Door in connection with Republic's securing of funding
for Won-Door through a private placement. Won-Door moved for summary
judgment on the precise grounds that Prince, Yeates urges the trial court erred in
rejecting here and obtained summary judgment in the trial court.14 On appeal the
Utah Court of Appeals reversed, allowing Republic to proceed to trial because
"[h]ere, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Republic, could
support a finding that a "reasonable" fee is what the parties actually agreed to, and
that the exact dollar amount would be settled in the future." Won-Door. 883 P.2d

14

Won-Door argued "the evidence provided by Republic only indicates that
the parties agreed a 'reasonable fee' would be paid" and "[tjhere was never an
agreement definitely as to what the fee agreement was." Won-Door, 883 P.2d at
290.
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at 291.1:>
Prince, Yeates' legal arguments, moreover, are all answered by the fact the
jury was properly instructed with instructions which Prince, Yeates does not
challenge in this appeal. The trial court correctly instructed the jury, without
exception by Prince, Yeates, that Mr. Young's original oral contract of
employment was a valid express contract, and the jury's task with respect to the
original contract of employment was simply to find the terms of that contract. [R.
at 1712].

15

Compare Gagne v. Vaccaro, No. 950372611, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS
936 (Conn. Super. Ct., April 7, 1997) (denying motion for summary judgment on
claim by former attorney against successor attorney for breach of contract for
reasonable and fair compensation out of the settlement of a personal injury case);
Foster v. Young, 156 P. 476 (Cal. 1916) (upholding judgment for attorney on
contract for payment of "reasonable" compensation); Pillois v. Billingsley, 179
F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1950) (upholding judgment for breach of a promise to pay a
"reasonable" fee for procuring a contract); Hogan v. Wright 356 F.2d 595, 59798 (6th Cir. 1966) ("Recovery has been allowed . . . where the facts disclose that
this was the intention of the parties or where . . . the payment to be made shall be
'reasonable1,, 'fair', 'right', or 'good'. . . . No arbitrary formula can be applied. The
facts of each case must be considered to determine the intentions of the parties.");
G. H. McShane Co., Inc. v. McFadden. 414 F. Supp. 720, 726-27 (W. D. Pa.
1976)(same); Corbin on Contracts § 4.3 at 572 (1993) ("At times the agreement is
explicit that a reasonable price will be agreed upon. In such a case, all should
agree that the agreement is sufficiently definite.").
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B.

The Jury's Special Verdict And The Trial Court's Judgment
Thereon Are Amply Supported By The Evidence With Regard To
Mr. Young's Claim For Breach Of Contract Based Upon Prince,
Yeates' Agreement To Pay Mr. Young Fair And Equitable
Compensation With Respect To The Helicopter Cases

The evidence presented to the jury on Mr. Young's claim for breach of
contract based upon Prince, Yeates' agreement to pay Mr. Young fair and
equitable compensation with respect to the helicopter cases, viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury's Special Verdict, also amply supports the jury's
verdict. The jury could well have concluded that Prince, Yeates entered into a
valid, binding agreement to pay Mr. Young fair and equitable additional
compensation in order to induce Mr. Young to remain at the Firm, that the
contract to pay fair and equitable compensation was not conditioned upon
agreement with regard to the amount of such additional compensation, and that
Prince, Yeates' made binding commitments notwithstanding its protestations that
the statements made by Mr. Chindlund and Mr. Ashton in their negotiations with
Mr. Young were simply "illusory", "indefinite", or "statements of mere intention",
subject to withdrawal or change of mind.
Again, Prince, Yeates' legal arguments are all answered by the fact that the
jury was properly instructed, which Prince, Yeates does not challenge in this
appeal, or on the ground that Prince, Yeates' legal arguments, to the extent that
they are not embodied in the trial court's instructions, misstate the law. The trial
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court correctly instructed the jury that the jury had to find that Prince, Yeates
made a definite offer and that Mr. Young accepted the offer through his
statements or conduct in order to find that Mr. Young had a valid contract for the
payment of fair and equitable compensation with respect to the helicopter cases.
[R. at 1706-1707; Addendum A (Jury Instructions)]. The trial court correctly
instructed the jury that mere statements of intention or illusory promises were
inadequate to establish the existence of an offer. [R. at 1706; Addendum A (Jury
Instructions)]. The trial court even instructed the jury, over Mr. Young's
objection, as to the provisions of the Restatement of Agency applicable in the
absence of an enforceable agreement. [R. at 1710; Addendum A (Jury
Instructions)]. The jury, having considered these instructions, could well have
determined to reject Prince, Yeates' view of the evidence and to adopt Mr.
Young's view of the evidence.
Again, the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in The Republic Group, Inc. v.
Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994) is instructive. In Won-Door,
the Utah Court of Appeals, in holding that Republic was entitled to proceed to
trial on its claim that it had an express oral contract for the payment of
"reasonable" compensation, explicitly rejected Prince, Yeates1 arguments that an
express oral contract for the payment of reasonable compensation is void or
unenforceable for failure of a meeting of the minds, for indefiniteness and
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uncertainty, or as an agreement to agree.16
C.

Mr. Young's Claim For Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of
Good Faith And Fair Dealing

The jury's Special Verdict is amply supported by the evidence with regard
to Mr. Young's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing - a claim which Prince, Yeates in its opening brief simply ignores.
In Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah App. 1994), the Utah Court of
Appeals recognized that if parties to a contract agree to "reasonable
compensation" and the party bound to make payment subsequently refuses to
make any detemiination as to the amount thereof, then, under the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, the party entitled to receive payment is entitled to
reasonable compensation "as determined by a court."
The purpose of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] is to
require that "the duties and rights created by the contract should be

,6

Indeed, Professor Corbin notes that once Mr. Young had performed and
generated the fee, Prince, Yeates was contractually bound to pay "fair"
compensation either pursuant to an express contract or. if the agreement was too
indefinite for enforcement, then in quasi contract:
"After . . . services [have been] actually rendered, the defendant is
bound to make reasonable compensation therefor, whether the
agreement under which the benefit was conferred was too indefinite
for enforcement or not. It then becomes unnecessary to determine
whether the defendant in reality promised to pay a reasonable price.
If the promise was made, the court is enforcing the express promise.
If the promise was not made, the duty to pay is described as quasicontractual, but it is identical in result."
Corbin on Contracts §4.5 at 595-596 (Vol. 1, 1993).
40

performed and exercised in good faith." Brehany v. Nordstrom,
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). The Restatement provides the
following example of the covenant: If A contracts to perform
services for B for such compensation "as you, in your sole
judgment, may decide is reasonable" and B subsequently
refuses to make any determination, A is entitled to the value of
the services as determined by a court. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 205 cmt. d, illus. 6 (1979).
Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d at 564, n. 18 (emphasis supplied). If, as the jury may
well have concluded, the parties agreed Mr. Young should receive "fair" or
"reasonable" compensation, in addition to salary, based upon his performance or
for a successful result in the Krause case, then upon successfully concluding the
case, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing permits Mr. Young to recover
"fair" or "reasonable" compensation, as determined by the court, even if Prince,
Yeates' refuses to agree on the amount of that fair compensation.17
D.

The Jury's Special Verdict And The Trial Court's Judgment
Based Thereon Should Be Summarily Affirmed Due To Prince,
Yeates' Failure To Marshal The Evidence And To Present The
Evidence In The Light Most Favorable To The Verdict

Prince, Yeates' appeal should be summarily denied on the ground that

,7

Likewise, in Won-Door the Utah Court of Appeals held that "[t]he Utah
Supreme Court has held f[t]he fact that part of the performance is that the parties
will enter into a contract in the future does not render the original agreement any
less binding.' Bunnell v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 87, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962)
(quoted in Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 897 (Utah 1988))."
Won-Door, 883 P.2d at 291, n. 5. Thus, the fact that Prince, Yeates and Mr.
Young had agreed to enter into a contract as to the fair amount of Mr. Young's
compensation did not render any less binding the original agreement to fairly
compensate Mr. Young from the Krause fee.
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Prince, Yeates has utterly ignored its obligation to marshal the evidence and to
present the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Brookside Mobile
Home Park v. Peebles. 48 P.3d 968. 975-976 (Utah 2002); Neely v. Bennett. 2002
Ut.App. 189, H 11, 51 P.3d 724.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PRINCE,
YEATES' JUNE 2001 MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OR IN GRANTING MR. YOUNG'S AUGUST 2001
CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The shocking reality of Prince, Yeates1 position on appeal with regard to its

forfeiture claim is that Mr. Young, who, during the term of his relationship with
Prince, Yeates, generated approximately $1,100,000 in fees for which he was paid
approximately $300,000 in salary ($580,000 including the jury award), "breached
his duty of loyalty to his employer" [ Brief at 30], breached his "fiduciary duty"
[Id. at 33], engaged in "dishonesty" and "embezzle[d] money". [Id. at 34]. In
sum, Mr. Young was a "disloyal employee" and a "faithless agent" [Id- at 36], as
well as an "unfaithful servant". [Id. at 39].
The fundamental flaw in Prince, Yeates' breach of fiduciary duty argument
is that unless Mr. Young was in a "fiduciary relationship" with Prince, Yeates, he
cannot be held to the fiduciary duty Prince, Yeates claims he breached.
Remarkably Prince, Yeates' Brief does not cite (much less attempt to distinguish)
the Utah cases in point or even one of the dozens of cases on which Mr. Young
relied to persuade the trial court that, as a mere employee, he had no fiduciary duty
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requiring him to surrender to Prince. Yeates the work or the fees it complains of.
[Compare Prince, Yeates^ Brief at pgs. 29-40 with R. at 1184-1232; 1382-1417].
Under Utah law, mere employees such as Mr. Young are not
fiduciaries. Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna. 625 P.2d 690, 695 (Utah
1981); Renshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co.. 49 P.2d 403 ; 405 (Utah 1935). In
Microbiological Research Corp., an employer claimed its employee violated a
fiduciary duty to disclose material information, and the trial court agreed. On
appeal this Court reversed because, while the employee had once been president
of the employer, by the time of his omission he had been demoted (while retaining
his employee status) to a mere consultant, researcher and lab director.
The trial court ruled that [the employee] had violated his
fiduciary duty to [the employer] by his failure to reveal [material
information] during . . . negotiations. . . . These negotiations
occurred after [the employeej's removal as a managing officer.
When a corporate officer ceases to act as such, because of his
resignation or removal, the fiduciary relationship ceases.
Microbiological Research Corp.. 625 P.2d at 695 (emphasis added); see also
Renshaw. 49 P.2d at 405 (rejecting contention that a mere employee is a fiduciary
of his employer because, among other things, "Plaintiff has cited no authority to
support such contention and we have been unable to find any.").
Utah's Court of Appeals has reached the same conclusion. In C&Y
Corporation v. General Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995). an
employer sued some of its directors for misappropriating a corporate opportunity.
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One of the directors defended on the ground that at the time of his alleged
disloyalty, he was no longer acting as a director, and therefore owed no duty to
surrender the opportunity to his employer. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed,
applying the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Microbiological Research Corp v.
Muna, that '"when a corporate officer [or director] ceases to act as such . . . the
fiduciary relationship ceases.'" Id. at 54-55, quoting Microbiological Research
Corp.,625P.2dat695. 18

18

See also DSC Communications v. Next Level Communications, 107 F.3d
322, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1997) (employees had no duty not to compete with employer
because "the usurpation of corporate opportunity doctrine isJnapplicable to
any[one] . . . who is not also an officer, director, or major shareholder of a
corporate entity."); UTAIC v. MacKeen & Bailey Inc.. 99 F.3d 645, 651 (5lh Cir.
1996) (actuary had no duty to surrender corporate opportunities to insurance
company because he was not an officer, director, or major shareholder to
company); Delta Environmental Prods., Inc. v. McGrew, 56 F. Supp. 2d 716, 71819 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (because employer "failed to plead any allegation which
would support a claim . . . that [employees] were 'officers,'. . . these [employees]
are not subject to the doctrine of usurpation of corporate opportunities."); Walter
E. Zemitzsch, Inc. v. Harrison, 712 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Mo.App. 1986) (employee
who was an officer with limited authority and not a director or shareholder was
not a fiduciary and therefore owed employer no duty not to compete); Modern
Materials v. Advanced Tooling, 557 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Wis.App. 1996)
(employee was under no duty not to compete with employer because such duty is
fiduciary in nature, and as a non-managerial employee, employee did not owe
fiduciary duties to employer); J Bar H, Inc. v. Johnson, 822 P.2d 849, 861-62
(Wyo. 1991) (employee who was an officer and director of employer in name only
could directly compete with employer because "she was not allowed any
meaningful participation in the management of the corporation" and thus "was
under no obligation not to compete when she formed her business."); Pruitt v.
United Chester Industries, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5767, *8 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
("Texas does not generally recognize a fiduciary duty between employers and
employees."); Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 (Cal.
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If there were the least bit of merit to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the
remedy of forfeiture is such a drastic remedy that it is reserved for serious and
material breaches. "The undesirability of [forfeiture] is well-stated by the legal
maxim that 'the law abhors forfeiture."' Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47
(Utah 1983); Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109
(Utah App. 1997) (same). Hence, the Restatement indicates forfeiture of an
agent's compensation is available only if the agent's breach is "a material breach of
duty." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 456 cmt. a (1958). This is consistent
with the notion that a breach of contract excuses the non-breaching party's
performance only if the breach is "material," i.e., only if it is a breach that "defeats
the very object of the contract." Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449.
451 (Utah 1979) (citation omitted); Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883
P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994).
Here, Prince, Yeates complains that "Mr. Young performed work for the
Charlesworth's [sic] for which he was ultimately paid $8,665.25. . . ." [Brief at 6].
What Prince, Yeates does not explain is that, of the $8,665.25 Prince, Yeates

App. 1966) ("Under prevailing judicial opinion no presumption of a confidential
[or fiduciary] relationship arises from the bare fact that parties to a contract are
employer and employee"); White v. Ransmeier & Spellman, 950 F. Supp. 39, 43
(D.N.H. 1996) ("The [employer's] claim, which seeks recovery for acts of an atwill, nonmanagerial employee, falls outside the scope of [accepted] conception^]
of the duty of loyalty, and beyond the scope of any cause of action for breach of
the duty of loyalty.").
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complains of. Mr. Young was "ultimately" paid $6,509.99 of that amount in
October 1999, i.e., three months after Mr. Young's relationship with the Firm
ended. Moreover, Prince, Yeates does not explain that when Mr. Young first
commenced work at the Finn, he brought with him several contingent fee cases
that he was already working on. Under the same rationale Prince, Yeates used, in
the trial court, to argue entitlement to the $6,509.99 Mr. Young received in
October 1999, Mr. Young argued entitlement to the sum of $20,857.33 paid
entirely to Prince, Yeates for work done before Mr. Young ever joined the Firm!
The trial court properly determined not to trouble the jury with this trivia19 in the
context of a dispute arising over the "fair" division of a $640,000 fee.
III.

PRINCE, YEATES FAILED TO PRESERVE AND WAIVED ITS
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING PRECLUDING
THE ADMISSION AT TRIAL OF EVIDENCE OF MR. YOUNG'S
ALLEGED BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Prince, Yeates failed to preserve and waived its challenge to the trial

court's ruling precluding the admission at trial of evidence of Mr. Young's
alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Prince, Yeates invited the trial court's ruling
precluding the admission at trial of evidence concerning Mr. Young's alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty. Prince, Yeates failed to argue in the trial court that the

19

Judge Bohling referred to these matters as "those little diddley . . . cases"
and those "de minimis matters that were just sort of handled on a personal basis."
[R. at 2025, pg. 233].
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evidence of Mr. Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty was relevant to the
issues at trial with regard to Mr. Young's claims, as it now urges for the first time
on appeal. Additionally, Prince, Yeates failed to seek the admission at trial of
evidence concerning Mr. Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty or even to
proffer any such evidence. Brookside Mobile Home-Park v. Peebles. 48 P.3d 968,
972 (Utah 2002); Badger v. Brooklyn Candy Company, 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah
1998).
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. YOUNG HIS
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED AS
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR PRINCE, YEATES' BREACH
OF CONTRACT
In Heslopv. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), the Court held:
The rationale for allowing attorney fees as recoverable damages
within the contemplation of the parties in first party insurer
claims is also applicable to employment claims.20

839 P.2d at 840 (emphasis added). In Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918
P.2d 461, 468 n.4 (Utah 1996), this Court noted that Heslop had extended its
cases calling for the recovery of attorney fees in first party insurance disputes to
employment contract disputes. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' decision in

20

This Court's decisions with regard to the recovery of attorney fees in first
party insurance disputes include Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d
795 (Utah 1985). Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d
651 (Utah 1988) and Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989),
and Billings v. Union Banker's Insurance Co.. 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996).
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Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, Inc., 1 P.3d 570 (Utah App. 2000),
relying on Zions, extends this first-party insurance contract rationale to a claim for
breach of contract for failure to repair a vehicle under a service contract, reasoning
that:
The policy concerns that led the Utah Supreme Court to allow for
recovery of attorney fees [in breach of first-party insurance contract
cases] applies with equal vigor to North American's breach of the
service contract in this case. Pugh's vehicle was stranded in Cedar
City for an entire year due to North American's refusal to pay for the
necessary repairs. North American's actions resulted in foreseeable
and provable consequential damages to Pugh, including the attorney
fees he had to incur in an ultimately successful effort to recover his
due. See Zions, 749 P.2d at 657
1 P.3d at 575 (Utah App. 2000).
The rationale of this Court's decisions in Heslop and Billings and the Court
of Appeals decision in Pugh, plainly afford Mr. Young a claim for the recovery of
attorneys' fees in this employment case. The trial court erred in denying Mr.
Young's claim for attorney fees.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. YOUNG
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Young prejudgment interest under

Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 on the basis that Mr. Young's claims for breach of
contract were "unliquidated". This Court's Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379
(Utah 1995) decision recognizes "[t]he law on this [prejudgment interest] issue is
clear" and the right to prejudgment interest depends upon whether the damages
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are measurable "by facts and figures" and not by whether the underlying claim for
damages is "unliquidated'*.
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is
fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by
facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time . . .
and not from the date of judgment. On the other hand, where
damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical
accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, wrongful death,
defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the
damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at
the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed.
898 P.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). Mr. Young's claims for damages for breach
of contract were unquestionably fixed at the date of receipt of the Krause fee in
September 1999 and were measurable "by facts and figures", entitling Mr. Young
to prejudgment interest.21

2,

The irony of the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest arises from the
fact the parties, in the trial court, stipulated to deposit the $641,548.38 fee in an
interest bearing account pending resolution of the dispute. R. at 6-9. At the time
of submitting this brief, that account has generated nearly $90,000 in interest. The
jury awarded Mr. Young $280,000 or approximately 44% of the fee as his "fair"
portion. Hence, although 44% of the accrued interest is attributable to Mr.
Young's "fair" portion of the fee, the Court's prejudgment interest ruling gives
Prince, Yeates 100% of that interest! "The purpose of a prejudgment interest
award is to compensate a plaintiff for actual loss or to prevent a defendant's
unjust enrichment." Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah
1989) (emphasis supplied). Here, the trial court's ruling allows Prince, Yeates to
collect interest not only on its share of the funds held in escrow, but also on Mr.
Young's share! Such a ruling, without question, unjustly enriches Prince. Yeates
at the expense of Mr. Young, who is the prevailing party!
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CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing law and argument, Mr. Young seeks this
Court's Order AFFIRMING (1) the jury's Special Verdict and the trial court's
Judgment thereon and (2) the trial court's orders (a) denying Prince, Yeates'
motions for summary and partial summary judgment and for a directed verdict and
(b) granting Mr. Young's motion for partial summary judgment. In addition, Mr.
Young seeks the Court's Order REVERSING the trial court's orders denying Mr.
Young a Prejudgment Interest Award and his reasonable attorneys' fees incurred
as consequential damages and REMANDING to the trial court for determination
of the amount of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees to which Mr. Young is
entitled.
DATED: October ll , 2002.
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross-Appellant Robert S. Young
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOBim mmm coos?
Thlrd JudiC(al District
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

NOV 3 0 2001
^SALT^AKE^UNTY
Deputy Clerk

PRINCE, YEATES &
GELDZAHLER, a professional
corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

ROBERT S. YOUNG,
Defendant

CASE NO:

990908360

THE JURY IS HEREBY CHARGED WITH THE LAW THAT APPLIES
TO THIS CASE IN THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS, NUMBERED (I)
THROUGH (3^), INCLUSIVE.
Dated this 3 6 day of November . 2001.
COURT:

'fS t
WILLIAM B. BOHLING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CP.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO. _A

Members of the jury, I would like to thank you for your attention during
this trial. I will now explain to you the rules of law that you must follow and
apply in deciding this case. When I have finished you will go to the jury room
and begin your discussions, what we call your deliberations.

Please pay

attention to the legal instructions I am about to give you. This is an extremely
important part of this trial.
You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but
must consider the instructions as a whole. The order in which the instructions
are given has no significance as to their relative importance. If a direction or
an idea is stated more than once, or in varying ways, no emphasis is intended
and none must be inferred by you.

l.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

3-

It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it
is your duty, as jurors to follow the law as I state it to you, regardless of what
you personally believe the law is or ought to be. Even if you do not like the
laws that must be applied, you must use them. On the other hand, it is your
exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and weigh
the evidence for that purpose. Your responsibility must be exercised with
sincere judgment, sound discretion and honest deliberation.

2-CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

1

This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel
sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case
based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion or
prejudice.

3.CV1

* - /*o

INSTRUCTION NO. H

This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard
from the witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other
tangible things admitted into evidence.
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be
considered by you in arriving at your verdict.
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made
during trial, except that stipulations read by the lawyers are evidence as I
instructed you when the stipulations were read.

INSTRUCTION NO. 5

Remember, the lawyers trying this case are not on trial. Your feelings about
them should not influence your decision in this case. The lawyers are here to
represent the best interests of their clients. It is the duty of the lawyer on each side
of a case to object when the other side offers evidence which the lawyer believes
is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the reasons for the objections,
nor should you allow yourself to become angry at a party because a partyf s lawyer
has made objections.

5.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO. ^

The fact that the plaintiff is a corporation and the defendant is an
individual, should make no difference whatever to you. It is your duty to hear and
determine this case the same as if it were between individuals. You should look
solely to the evidence for the facts and to the instructions I give you for the law,
and return a true and just verdict according to the facts established by the
evidence and the law as I have stated it to you.

INSTRUCTION NO. T.

A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial

evidence consists of facts or circumstances that give rise to a reasonable
inference of the truth of the facts sought to be proved.

7.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of
deposition. You are not to discount this testimony for the sole reason that it
comes to you in the form of a deposition. It is entitled to the same
consideration as if the witness had personally appeared.

8.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO. <J
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile such
conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where the conflict cannot be
reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine from the evidence
what the facts are. There are no definite rules governing how you shall
determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall
determine what the facts in this case are. But you should carefully and
conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimony, and all of the facts
and circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, and determine
therefrom what the facts are. You are not bound to believe all that the
witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of witnesses unless such
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and
circumstances in evidence. You may believe one witness as against many, or
many as against a fewer number in accordance with your honest convictions.
The testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on one matter
is naturally less convincing on other matters. So if you believe a witness has
wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact in this case, you may disregard
the whole of the testimony of such witness, or you may give it such weight as
you think it is entitled to.
U.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

ID

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility
of the witnesses you have a right to take into consideration their bias, their
interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to
testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' deportment
upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent
frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their ability
to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should consider these
matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you may
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses'
statement.

12.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

\\

Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of proof rests
upon a certain party, or that a party must prove a certain proposition, or that
you must find a certain proposition to be true, I mean that unless the truth
of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall find
that the same is not true.

13.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

\*L

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which,
in your minds, seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and
satisfactory. The preponderance of the evidence is not determined by the
number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but by the convincing
character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you. If
the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you
must find that such allegation has not been proved.

14.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO. _ v 3
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler has the burden of proof in this case to establish
that Robert Young was an employee of the firm when the fee in the Krause case
was earned, that Mr. Young was entitled to receive salary and benefits and no
other compensation, and that the fee was earned while Mr. Young was acting
within the scope of his employment Mr. Young bears the burden of proof on the
basis of the existence of any contract regarding his entitlement to a portion of the
Krause fee.

4.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO. J_+
A contract is an agreement.
A contract may be either express or implied from the facts and
circumstances.
A contract may be written or oral.
A contract may consist of several documents, verbal agreements, or both.

INSTRUCTION NO.
A valid express contract exists where:
1.

One party made an offer to the other party;

2.

The party to whom the offer was made accepted the offer; and

3.

Each party gave something in return for what that party received.

INSTRUCTION NO. _Ji_
An offer is a definite proposal to enter into a specific contract upon
acceptance by the person receiving the offer. A mere expression of intention or
general willingness to do something on the happening of a particular event or in
return for something to be received does not amount to an offer.

INSTRUCTION NO. jJ7_
A valid express contract exists if:
1.

Prince Yeates or Mr. Young communicated an offer to the other; and

2.

Prince Yeates or Mr. Young accepted the offer and communicated

the acceptance of the offer.
Unless a particular mode of acceptance is specified by the offer, the
acceptance does not need to be express or formal. Acceptance may be shown by
writing, words, or conduct that indicates agreement to the offer. However, an
offer must be accepted in its entirety. An offer cannot be accepted in part and
rejected in part.

INSTRUCTION NO.

I&

Further, the terms of a contract may be express or implied. A contract may
contain both express and implied terms. In express terms, the parties reach their
agreement by spoken or written words. In implied terms, the agreement is implied from
the parties' acts and conduct. Implied terms may also be shown by custom and usage.

INSTRUCTION NO. 15
Whether negotiations with regard to compensation for services result in the
formation of an express contract depends upon the parties reaching an agreement.
If the parties are merely negotiating the terms of a possible future agreement
without intending or expecting to be bound, no contract has been formed. On the
other hand, if the parties agree and intend to be bound to pay reasonable
compensation, a contract may be found to exist even though the dollar amount of
compensation remains to be determined.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2D
Unless otherwise agreed in the original employment contract or a valid
modification of the contract, an employee who makes a profit in connection with
a transaction conducted by him on behalf of his employer is under a duty to give
such profit to his employer.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2\
An agent has a right to retain possession of money where he has gained
possession in the proper execution of his agency, until he is paid the amount due him
from the principal as compensation for services performed.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2. JL

You are instructed that Mr. Young's oral employment agreement with Prince
Yeates is a valid express contract. Your task with regard to Mr. Young's oral
employment agreement with Prince Yeates is to determine the terms of the contract.

INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 3
You are instructed that Mr. Young was not employed for any definite
period of time and was therefore free at any time to leave Prince Yeates'
employment Further, if Mr. Young left Prince Yeates' employment, his clients
would be free to choose whether he would continue to handle legal matters which
he handled at the Firm. Accordingly, if you find that Prince Yeates offered Mr.
Young additional compensation in order to induce him to remain at the Firm, you
may find that Mr Young's conduct in remaining at the Firm constituted
acceptance, and the giving of something in return to the Firm.

INSTRUCTION NO.

24

Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
with respect to the dealings between the parties. The parties to a contract must deal fairly
and honestly with each other. Nevertheless, this duty of good faith and fair dealing does
not create any implied obligation contradictory to the express provisions of the contract.
Also, the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not mean that a party is obligated to
exercise any of the party's contract rights to the party's own detriment for the purpose of
benefitting another party to the contract.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^ ^

Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises
that he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract.
To comply with this obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified
expectations of the other party.
The purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties should be determined
by considering the contract language and the course of dealing between and conduct of
the parties.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2 £

The duty of good faith and fair dealing requires parties to negotiate omitted terms
in a contract in good faith. It is a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing for a party to refuse in bad faith to complete negotiations.

INSTRUCTION NO.

z

7

If you find that Mr. Young is contractually entitled to compensation with regard to
the Krause fee, whether express or implied, you should award Mr. Young an amount
which represents fair, equitable and reasonable compensation.

INSTRUCTION NO. J£_
You are instructed that the Krause contingent fee (the "Krause fee") in the
amount of $641,548.38, was paid on behalf of Mr. Krause by a check drawn
jointly to both Mr. Young and Prince Yeates.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

In determining any fact in this case you should not consider nor be
influenced by any statement made or act done by the court which you may
interpret as indicating its views thereon. You are the sole and final judges of
all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe the court
thinks thereon. The court has not intended to express, or intimate, or be
understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show,
or what are or what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what
the court thinks thereon.

You must follow your own views and not be

influenced by the views of the court.

24.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO. 3D

The lawyers,like you and myself, are officers of this Court. It is the duty
of each of them to present the evidence on behalf of the client and to make
such objections as he or she deems proper and to argue fully the client's cause.
You should, however, bear in mind that each of the lawyers is here in a
partisan capacity, and it is both their duty and responsibility to be advocates
of the position he or she claims for the client. If during the trial or in their
closing arguments, the lawyers have made statements concerning the evidence
which do not conform with your recollection of it, you should disregard the
lawyers' statements and rely solely on your own recollection of the evidence.
If either lawyer's argument includes statements of the law which differ from
the law which I have given you, you should disregard such statements and rely
entirely on the law as given to you by the Court.

25.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO. 3 \

The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules
of law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict.
The applicability of some of these instructions will depend upon the
conclusions you reach as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the
fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the
court and that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If
an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does not exist, you
will disregard the instruction.

26.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

12-

The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their deliberations are
a matter of considerable importance. It is rarely productive of good for a
juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of his
opinion on the case or to announce a determination to stand for a certain
verdict. When one does that at the outset, his sense of pride may be aroused,
and he may hesitate to recede from an announced position if shown that it is
fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter,
but are judges. The final test of the quality of your service will lie in the
verdict which you return to the court, not in the opinions any of you may hold
as you retire. Have in mind that you will make a definite contribution to
efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. To
that end, the court would remind you that in your deliberations in the jury
room there can be no triumph excepting the ascertainment and declaration of
the truth and the administration of justice based thereon.

27.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

?._?

It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate
with a view to reaching an agreement, if your individual judgment allows such
agreement. You each must decide the case for yourself, but only after
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to
change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not
surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of
the other jurors.

28.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

?4

The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to
chance. If you decide that a party is entitled to recover, you may then
determine the amount of damages to be awarded.lt would be unlawful for you
to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror, then total
the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the
amount of your award. Each of you may express your own independent
judgment as to what the amount should be. It is your duty to thoughtfully
consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light of the law and the
evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such
individual estimates is proper.

29.CV1

INSTRUCTION NO.

35"~

It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit
to you. In making your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the
burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming the fact to
be true, and that fact must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return
a verdict. At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but
they need not be the same six on each question. As soon as six or more of you
have agreed on the answer to each question, have the verdict signed and dated
by your foreperson and then return it to this room.

30.CVI

INSTRUCTION NO.

1(e

Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as
foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to
which you agree. The foreperson should not dominate the jury, but the
foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the opinions of the
other members of the jury.

31.CVI

TabB
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PRINCE, YEATES &
GELDZAHLER, a professional
corporation,

SPECIAL VERDICT
CASE NO. 990908360

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT S. YOUNG,
Defendant.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the
evidence. If youfindthe evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented,
answer "yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence
preponderates against the issue presented, answer "no."

-2-

1.

Do you find that Mr. Young was entitled to additional compensation

as a result of the Krause fee either under his original oral employment contract
or a valid contract with regard to the helicopter cases?
ANSWER: Yes_ 7 X.

No

If you answered Question No. 1 "no," you need not answer Question
No. 2.
2.

What is the fair and reasonable amount of the fee which should be

paid to Mr. Young?
$

Dated this fd day of November, 2001.

's^s&^P^y

FOREPERSON

'
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AFR 2 2 20Q2
Daniel L. Berman (0304)
Samuel 0. Gaufin (1170)
BERMAN GAUFIN TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff

Deputy Clerk

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER, a
professional corporation,

;
]
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, ]
i

Civil No. 990908360

I

Judge William B. Bohling

v.

t

ROBERT S. YOUNG,

|

Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff. ]

This matter came on regularly for jury trial November 27, 2001 through
November 30, 2001. The plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler ("Prince Yeates") was represented by M. David Eckersley, Esq. The
defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Robert S. Young "(Mr. Young") was represented by
Samuel O. Gaufin, Esq. The parties made opening statements, presented evidence,
and made closing arguments.
Following the instructions of the Court, the jury returned its Special Verdict as
fOllOWS:

InHnmont , n H OrHpr fl> I

JD

1.
Do you find that Mr. Young was entitled to additional
compensation as a result of the Krause fee either under his original oral
employment contract or a valid contract with regard to the helicopter
cases?
ANSWER: Yes _A_

No

2.
What is the fair and reasonable amount of the fee which
should be paid to Mr. Young?
$280,000
Subsequently, the Court received: Mr. Young's proposed form of Judgment;
Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Judgment; Plaintiffs Motion for Stay of Execution
Pending Appeal, For Alternative Security, and For Disbursement of Funds; and Mr.
Young's Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses.
On April 1, 2002, the foregoing post-trial matters all came on regularly for
hearing before the Court. At this hearing, Prince Yeates was again represented by Mr.
David Eckersley, Esq. Mr. Young was again represented by Samuel O. Gaufin.
Argument was heard, following which the Court, being fully advised, ruled upon the
posWrial matters and directed that this Judgment and Order be prepared reflecting the
Judgment and the Court's post-trial rulings.
Now, in accordance with the jury verdict and the Court's post-trial rulings, the
Court enters this Judgment and Order as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Mr. Young shall have judgment against Prince Yeates in the sum of

$280,000.

2

2.

Mr. Young shall furtbgr have judgment against Prince, Yeates for his costs

in the sum of $
3.

The judgments awarded in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof shall bear post-

judgment interest at the statutory rate for judgments.
4.

The Court rules that Mr. Young's claims for compensation were

unliquidated, rules that Mr. Young is not entitled to any prejudgment interest, and
sustains Prince Yeates' Objection to the award of prejudgment interest.
5.

With regard to Plaintiff's Motion for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal, For

Alternative Security, and For Disbursement of Funds and that aspect of Plaintiffs
Objection to Proposed Judgment relating thereto, the Court rules that: the funds
deposited with Fidelity Investment pursuant to this Court's Order, dated August 31,
1999, shall remain on deposit pending appeal and further order; no distribution of the
funds deposited with Fidelity Investment shall be made either to Mr. Young or Prince
Yeates pending appeal and further order; and execution by Mr. Young on the
judgments awarded in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof shall be stayed pending appeal and
further order.
6.

The Court rules that Mr. Young is not entitled to attorney fees under the

rationale of Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) and denies Mr. Young's
Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses.

3

DATED: April 2 ^ r 2 0 0 2 .
BY THE COURT:

*Ul\
Judge William B. Pohljng
District Court Judge ~~"~:7
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

M. David Eckersley,
City Centre I, Suite 9(
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant

BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

Samuel ONSaufin
50 South Main, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Defendant and
Counterclaim Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / / day of October, 2002 I caused two copies
of BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT to be mailed, postage
prepaid, to:
M. David Eckersley. Esq.
Prince. Yeates & Geldzhaler
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

52

